Influence of Social Identity, Justice Perceptions and Moral Solidarity on Citizen’s Cooperation against Terrorism in Nigeria

by

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Abstract
The influence of social identity, perceptions of justice and moral solidarity on citizen’s cooperation in combating crime and terrorism in Nigeria was investigated in this study. Data were collected from two-hundred and forty-four (244) senior secondary students of the International School, University of Ibadan through the captive (convenient) classroom procedure. Results of analysis of covariance showed that moral solidarity and justice perceptions were significantly related to, and predicted, cooperation to fight terrorism. Social identity however did not show any impressive relationship with citizen’s cooperation in combating crime and terrorism. The results also showed no gender difference in citizens’ cooperation to combat crime and terrorism. The result implied that cooperation to fight crime and terrorism may depend in one part, on the meaningfulness of justice to people whose sensibilities and views of justice have, in the infancy, been distorted by senseless terrorist conflicts and threats to meaningful life; and in another part on peoples’ perception of what constitutes the good life. It was, therefore, important that co-ordinated synergies between government and other social agencies be strengthened as a way of evolving a socially-rewarding and stable society regulated by strong values, fibrous family ties and economically beneficial routes of self-development capable of drawing the citizenry into a vanguard of patriots who will find no attraction in prejudice, crime and related criminal and terrorist activities.

Keywords: citizen’s cooperation, justice perceptions, moral solidarity, social identity, terrorism in Nigeria.

1. Introduction
From evolutionary times, human cooperation was derived from mutualistic collaboration (Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman and Hermman, 2012). Generally, cooperation has been found to be an essential exchange process among groups.
According to Shaffer, Sasaki, Haney, Janssen, Pratt and Ferwell (2016), the evolution of cooperation is a fundamental problem in biology, especially for non-relatives, where indirect fitness benefits cannot counter within-group inequalities. While cooperation enhances quality of life among groups, it becomes very essential in moments of challenge and opposition. The escalation of insurgency in Nigeria since 2009 has not only raised security concerns among the people, it has also increased the need for citizenship cooperation on security matters in the country. Insurgency implies terrorism which is defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by non-state actors to attain political, economic, religious or social goals through fear, coercion or intimidation (La Free and Ackerman, 2009). While terrorism by humans has been viewed as both a syndrome (inbuilt natural tendencies to violence) and a tool (strategic conflict instrument), the continuous emaciation of the world with terror to an extent corroborates Barack Obama’s recent comment on the abduction of “a generation” of girls from Nigeria’s Chibok community and other sectarian conflicts brewing around the world. According to President Obama, such inhuman event was able to take its place in the history books because “we have not (yet) extinguished man’s darkest impulse” (The Punch, May 9, 2014).

Terrorism falls under the psychology of hatred (Harrington, 2004) that emanates partly from perspectives of the authoritarian personality and social dominance (Ardono, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 2004; Duckitt, 2003). Based on certain misgivings, some people believe the wind of terrorist activities blowing across the country is directed at dismembering or adjourning Nigeria as a group, reminding us of Tuckman and Jensen’s (1997) stages of development in ‘small’ groups. According to this reasoning, groups develop through the course of five related stages – forming, norming, performing, storming and adjourning. If we consider Nigeria in this perspective it is not pertinent that Nigeria has reached the adjourning stage. Violence and the threat of violence to control people and territorial space is an idea older than history (Kruglansk and Fishman, 2007) and the only means to overcome such organized violence is group cooperative behaviour.

In the recent past, Nigeria’s former information minister, Labaran Maku while commenting on the devastating terrorist crossfire in the country reemphasized the need for cooperation between the citizenry and the security services as the only way to win the war against terror. The fact of the non-definition of neither the battlefield nor the enemy in any terrorist confrontation makes every terror war difficult to fight, showing that success strongly depends on peoples’ cooperation in identifying the enemy who lives among them. Apart from this, peoples’ cooperation is basically important in information gathering and collaboration with security agencies in reporting criminal and terrorist activities. As indicative of the works of Tyler and Fagan (2008), cooperation by the citizenry has become an important element in government’s efforts in lowering crime and creating secure communities. Such cooperation involves reporting crime and working directly with security agencies to fight with the aim of eradicating crime. It is very disappointing that the 2013 Global Peace Index, has placed Nigeria in the 151st position among 162 countries down from 117, 129, 137, 142, and 146 positions in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively (Institute for Economics and Peace: Global Peace Index, 2007-2012). This drastic decline is blamed on Boko Haram’s unending onslaught on the nation’s psyche.
In governance, citizen cooperation is an important aspect of political and patriotic behaviour and forms an important aspect of the leadership continuum. It also represents an important component of political participation. Tyler and Blader (2000) had distinguished between two classes of cooperative behaviour: mandatory and discretionary cooperative behaviour. While mandatory cooperative behaviour is stipulated by the group, discretionary cooperation originates with the group member. Co-operation is experienced when citizens align with law enforcement officers to expose, fight and contain acts of violence and terrorism in defense of their communities. But peoples’ cooperation with their government is most times derivative and therefore tangential on certain expectations. To understand such expectations, Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel and Rup (2001) examined the salience of justice research based on three basic questions: How do people formulate appraisals of justice? Why do individuals do so? And what precisely is being appraised? Answers to these questions form the basis for all forms of “organizational citizenship behaviour” such as cooperation to fight extreme activities in one’s country.

But, citizens’ cooperation with authorities depends on a number of factors implicated in research findings. For example, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) have demonstrated that people’s cooperation with agents of government is normally motivated in part by their judgement that such agents (who were represented by the police in their study) are prototypical representatives of the group’s moral values. They explained derivatively that people view authorities as expressing the values of the group in addition to fulfilling their instrumental role as maintainers of social order. All these depend on people’s engagement, perceptions of justice and moral solidarity – important relational indices between government and the governed which, in turn, is predicated on peoples’ assessment of the legitimacy of authorities. Basically, justice perceptions occur in two directions. These are procedural justice and distributive justice directions. Procedural justice is perceived by individuals when they are proud to belong to and be respected by groups whose authorities follow fair procedures, while distributive justice reported by people comes to play when they (citizens) are motivated by the fairness of the outcomes they receive for their membership in a group.

Social Identity and Cooperative Behaviour

Social identity is one of the three dimensions of psychological ownership which Furby (1978) described as human’s sense of possession, the other two strands being (1) efficacy or reflectance experienced as a feeling of control over the environment or ability to change it and (2) the need of having one’s own place. It is the process by which we define ourselves in terms and categories that we share with people (Deaux, 1996). Social identity is linked to one’s membership in various social groups and in the case of a nation, represents a sense of national identity. For example, Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) social identity theory relates identification with social groups as the main source of in-group favouritism and out-group derogation, accompanied by negative out-group attitudes. In the case of Nigeria, the current Boko Haram activities represent a dimension of “out-group” derogation by the sect on the national consciousness of the country. On the other hand, the level of one’s (citizen’s) integration with and identification with the country determines the level of cooperation they are likely to give in the task of national defence and protection. Social or national identity as seen by Smith (2001) exists at two levels: the ethnic level, which is defined by (1) a shared ancestral origin and (2) the civil identity
level defined in terms of participation in society and citizenship. From the perspective of the social identity theory (Tajfel and Tourner, 1979), individuals who highly identify with the national group are likely to hold more positive attitudes towards cooperative behaviour to fight terrorism. Recently, Sindic (2011) has argued that national identity presents particular characteristics that make it consonant with the notion of citizenship in ways that other identities might not always be. Comparing the national outlook of Nigeria to the Boko Haram group, Nigeria is by all standards a majority group. Because majority group members often define national identity and national belonging in ethnic terms (Pehrson, Vignotes and Brown, 2009), individuals not associated with the group in question will naturally be perceived as national out-group members. This has been confirmed by findings that ethnicity-based identity representations are associated with less-positive attitudes towards minority members of the society (Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeseleare and Boen, 2010).

As argued by Tyler and Blader (2003), an important function of groups (which can also be exemplified by nations) is to provide people with a way of constructing social identity. This line of reasoning is domiciled in the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003) which hypothesizes that justice procedures are important because they shape people’s social identities within groups or societies; and social identity in turn influences attitudes, values and behaviours. In other words, the group identity model hypothesizes that when people identify more strongly with a group, they will be more willing to act cooperatively with that group by investing their time and energy in working to see the group succeed (Tyler and Blader, 2003). The relationship between national (social) identification by various ethnic sections in Nigeria and cooperation to fight terror can be theoretically explained by using the group engagement model (Tyler and Blader, 2003).

The group engagement model contrasts two potentially important aspects of groups either or both of which shape group member’s cooperation and engagement: the group’s identity implications for individuals (Hogg, 2007; Hogg and Abrams, 1988) and absolute or relative resources gained or lost from group membership (Tyler and Blader, 2000). The component of the model predicts that peoples’ willingness to cooperate with their group in discretionally (optional or voluntary) ways (moral solidarity) relies specifically on the identity information they receive from the group (Tyler and Blader, 2003). Social identity as explained by the group engagement model is distinguished into three aspects of identity including: (1) identification (the degree to which people merge their sense of self with the group – thinking of themselves and the group in similar terms); (2) pride (basking in group’s reflected glory, i.e. people who belong to groups that they feel have high status feel good about themselves by virtue of their association with the group; and (3) respect or social reputation (judgments about one’s status within the group as upheld “in the eyes of other beholders, i.e. other group members (Elner & Hopkins, 1990; Tyler and Blader, 2003). Some research (Smith, Tyler and Huo, 2002, Tyler and Smith, 1999), show that people draw identity relevant information from the quality of treatment they receive from authorities during their interactions with key group authorities. This line of research therefore delineates the group engagement model into the relational model of authority which builds upon both social identity and self-categorization approaches, through the perception that people incorporate important group membership (or social identities) into their self-concept (Ellemers Spears and Doosje,
1999; Tajfel and Turner, 1986, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell, 1997). We can therefore view Nigeria’s current state of insurgency and peoples’ responses to cooperation from traditional levels of authority relations which include social exchange and interdependence theories (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) and realistic group conflict theories (Campbell, 1965; Sheriff, 1966; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994).

Roles of Perceived Justice in Cooperative Behaviour

There is always a noticeable difference in people’s views on matters of justice in situations of conflict. When people are asked to say what type of justice they prefer in conflict situations, those who role-play conflict situations concentrate on distributive justice (Tyler, Hou and Lind, 1999). However, when people come face to face with bare conflict, their choice centres basically on procedural justice (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar and Samuelson, 1985). This differential maneuvering means that people’s perceived justice judgments revolve along two directions. In one situation, perceived justice resides in the rules used in the distribution of resources (distributive justice) and in another situation justice is viewed as being strongly linked to quality treatment, issues such as treating people with politeness and dignity in social interactions (Tyler and Bladder, 2003). When people feel they have been fairly treated, they are more likely to cooperate in social dilemmas, show more voluntary compliance (through moral solidarity) and show more support for authorities (Tyler and Lind, 1992; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith and Huo, 1997). Perception of justice here also includes accountability, norm and affinity questions (Huth and Allee, 2002; Imai and Tingley, 2011).

Generally, justice has been seen as a key issue in understanding human social behaviour (Cropanzano and Folger, 1989, 1991; Cropanzano and Greenberg, 1997). Accordingly, numerous justice research have shown that procedural fairness, a mirror aspect of the general justice construct (the other aspect being distributive justice) may affect people’s reactions more than distributive or outcome fairness perceptions – a condition which researchers have labeled the fair process effect (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Folger, 1980; Tyler and DeGoy, 1995; Van den Bos and Lind, 2001; Tyler and Blader; Sunshine and Tyler 2003). This becomes obvious because the attention of justice researchers have increasingly shifted from studying only distributive justice to focus on people’s distributive and procedural justice concerns (Tyler and Blader, 2003). This has been premised on a number of arguments including the biased nature (Messick and Sentis, 1985; Thompson & Leowenstein, 1992); and limited utility (Tyler and Blader, 2003) of distributive judgment research and the predominant influence of procedural justice on people’s group behaviour (Alexander and Ruderman, 1987; Tyler and Caine, 1981). The challenging insurgency situation in Nigeria has also been blamed on dimensions of justice perceptions on burning national issue including both procedural justice of governance and distributive justice of rights, privileges and the sharing of the country’s abundant wealth to the federating units. Given that the North-south political heritage of the country has always placed Nigerians on equally antagonizing polar positions, old prejudices and perceptions of injustice are readily brought into any national issue tabled for negotiation. Boko Haram, the armed group confronting the Nigerian government has refused to come out clearly on their grievances except the ludicrous religious threat to Islamize some territories of Nigeria as part of the global campaign to advance Islam. While the international community have joined some of the local voices to blame the Nigerian
confrontation on perceived impoverishment of the Northern part of the country, a discordant argument is that Boko Haram was an emotional reaction to the loss of political power by the Northern elites (and group) to Goodluck Jonathan before the emergence of Buhari’s “change” government. According to Alozieuwa, (2012):

“Its (Boko Haram’s) emergence was preceded by intense political bickering between some, mainly Muslim political actors in the north and their southern counterparts in the south in the period leading to the electoral victory of President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian and southerner ... the North was soar for having “lost” power again to the south by virtue of Yar’Adua’s death in May 2010”.

The power-loss argument was further supported with the strong evidence that the quality of sophisticated weapons wielded by the insurgents is by no means a by-product of poverty, neither is the inhuman crime of massive homicides an ordinary reaction to distributive justice. Also, generally some citizens were aggrieved that government did not apply the right procedure to end the insurgency, accusing it of treating the insurgents with kid-gloves. All these were issues predicated on the quality of cooperation citizen’s were willing to give towards the fight to end terrorism in the country.

Moral solidarity as an Elixir of Cooperative Behaviour

Our condensing argument on the quality of cooperation citizens may be willing to give in the course of fighting terrorism in Nigeria is an issue bordering on people’s morality, especially as patriots of one’s country or any other object of interest as such. Morality is deeply rooted on obligations to one’s country. Moral solidarity therefore denotes the belief that “the values and tenets of law enforcement authorities are consistent with one’s personal beliefs about right or wrong (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). As a multicultural people, Nigerians are custodians of varied beliefs and views about the values and tenets of social engagement, governance and law enforcement in comparison with their personal beliefs about right or wrong. Moral solidarity with government is therefore a function of the direction (positive or negative) and import of such beliefs.

At the moment the situation in Nigeria has made peoples’ reactions on these issues very impeditive, especially their responses to the diverse nature of political and socio-economic views. Depending on one’s social and political worldview, Nigerians have engaged (identified) with their government either positively or negatively, perceived governments’ procedural and distributive justice equally positively or negatively and direct their solidarity with government either-way: morally or immorally. This has a way of impacting the quality of solidarity, content of morality and style of relationship between government and the governed.

Moral Solidarity: Perspectives from Psychological Contract and Sustainable Relationships

The world over, all forms of engagement between people and government or between people and people are regarded as relationships. As observed by some researchers (Miller, 2001, Smith, Tyler and Huo, 2002), people in relationships do not operate under explicit agreements of entitlements, but under something more informal and flexible commonly referred to as “psychological contract”. This is based on the understanding of what is and is not acceptable to the relationship (Coyle-Shapiro and
Parzefall, 2008; Robinson, 1996; Taylor, Tracy, Renard, Harrison and Carroll, 1995) and their entitlements, including when a sense of rightness has been violated (Croppanzo and Byrne, 2000). As observed in organizational circles, social systems cannot function without some degree of agreement on the norms that regulate interpersonal relationships, norms which provide answers to some of the basic questions of social life (Skitka, Winquist and Hutchinson, 2003).

But at certain times, groups, including democracies can undermine their own moral statutes when they violate human rights and when some politicians or the media create a climate in which such violations are preemptively justified and excused (Heinz and Arend, 2005). When this happens, both citizens and government relate with distrust and accusations, compromising solidarity and the moral plank that drives cooperation. For instance, after a controversial bomb attack on General Muhamadu Buhari, a former and present Nigerian head of state, a Nigerian preacher and former running mate to Buhari in the 2011 presidential elections, Tunde Bakare attributed the reign of terror in Nigeria to “sheer psychosis”, emphasizing that “radical Islam” among other issues such as zoning of governmental positions, deprivation, oppression and injustice were responsible for terror and not “traditional Islam” (Bakare, 2014). This aligns with the relative deprivation hypothesis (which centres on justice perceptions) as a contributing factor to terrorist activities. According to this school of thought, radical Islam tends to alleviate peoples’ sense of relative deprivation and help restore their dignity, gain a sense of spiritual calling and promote their values (Sageman 2004). To substantiate this, Sageman (2004) described how a group of wealthy core Arabs (including Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia and Yemen), who were sent by their families to acquire western education, were either alienated, underemployed or discriminated against in the European diasporas and suggested that such circumstances were capable of triggering some sense of unhappiness and humiliation in the “victims”. Apart from this, Bloom (2005) also associated terrorism with a broad band of motivations which may include desire for honour, social status, personal significance, dedication to the leader, pain and personal loss, group pressure, humiliation and injustice, vengeance or feminist projection – issues that have played out one way or the other in the Nigerian situation.

In this study we hypothesize that social identity, perceptions of justice and moral solidarity will predict the level of cooperation of the citizenry in collaborating with governmental authorities to combat terror in affected and/or threatened communities in Nigeria.

2. **Material and Method**

The design used for the study was field survey. A survey was preferred because the study was interested in knowing what people are thinking about and would do in relation to cooperating with government agencies to fight terrorism.

The International School, University of Ibadan was the setting of the study. In spite of their ages (12-16 years), participants (students in their teens) were used based on group-norm theory of prejudice which holds that all groups (whether in-groups or reference groups) develop a way of living, with characteristic codes and beliefs, standards and “enemies” to suit their own adaptive needs (Alport, 1958). According to Allport, Felix le Dantec’s “Group-Norm Theory of Prejudice holds that social groups have a standard system of beliefs, codes and enemies and that pressure from within the group(s)
holds everyone in line with group ideals and limit any individual deviation (Allport, 1954). The application of this theory literally means that every family or every other group has a common enemy and according to Allport, it was the individual’s psychological needs that formed the in-group and held it together. Therefore, by default, the population serves as a representative of the adult population. It was expected that the students’ views would be a reflection of related views of significant adults (such as parents) about the political and security situation in the country, as an outcome of socialization. Informed consent was obtained from the children and assented to by teachers as representatives of their parents. According to the policy statement regarding enrollment of children in research in Nigeria (ps2.1016) (B2) “For children between 12 and less than 18 years, the child must give assent while relevant parents as described in B1 below, and appropriate to each specific research scenario gives consent”. (B1: Enrollment of children below the age of 12 years requires consent of both parents and the parent that has primary responsibility for the child at the time of research or the legal guardian).

Participants
Two hundred and forty-four (244) students made up of SS1 (134, 54.9 percent) and SS2 (110, 45.1 percent) participated in the study as follows: Igbo = 28 (11.48 percent), Yoruba = 212 (86.89 percent) and Hausa = 4 (1.64 percent); Male = 135 (55.8 percent) and female 109 (44.2 percent); as well as Christians = 186 (76.23 percent) and Muslim = 58 (27.33 percent). They were aged 12-16 years (x = 14.42).

Instruments
Social Identity Scale: The Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) identification with the community scale was adapted and used to assess citizens’ social identity. It is a 6-item scale on a 6-point Likert format ranging from “Strongly Disagree (1)” to “Strongly Agree (6)”. The scale was conceived from Tyler and Blader’s interrelated components of feelings of pride in the group. The Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient of the scale from the authors is .93. Item samples include: “The values of most of the people in my country are very similar to mine”, I think that most people in my country would value what I contribute to my country”.

Moral Solidarity Scale: The moral solidarity index by sunshine and Tyler (2003) was also used to assess moral solidarity of participants. It is a 7-item index measured on a six-point Likert format ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. Typical items are: “the law is usually consistent with the values of the people in my neighbourhood about what is right or wrong”. “The police in my neighbourhood act in ways that are consistent with my own moral values about how people should be treated”. Alpha coefficient of the scale is .87, mean 3.91 and SD = 1.06.

Cooperation with the Community Scale: We assessed cooperation using sunshine and Tyler’s 10-item cooperation scale. It is a 6-point Likert-type scale. Participants were asked how likely they would be to (1) “call the police to report a crime occurring in their neighbourhood”, (2) “call the police to report an accident ...” “volunteer to attend a community meeting to discuss crime in their neighbourhood” etc. Author alpha coefficient was .87, mean = 4.38 and SD .93.
Justice Perception Measures: Justice Perception was measured by Sunshine and Tyler’s procedural and distributive justice measures. It is a 7-item Likert-type scale made up of 2 items for procedural fairness and 5 items for distributive fairness. The scale inquires how often the police will (1) “make decisions about how to handle problems in fair ways” (procedural) and (2) “are the outcomes people receive from the police better than they deserve or worse than they deserve are about what they deserve under the law” (distributive). Alpha coefficients were (mean =3.95, SD=1.7 and .76, mean = 3.95, SD, 1.17 and .76, mean = 3.4, SD = 1.04 respectively for procedural and distributive justice.

Procedure: Data was collected through the questionnaire method. The researchers approached the vice-principal of the school and requested for the recruitment of her students as participants in a study bordering on patriotism and cooperation. After clarifications and consent, she assigned the researchers to a group of teachers who introduced the researchers and their purpose to the students. The students were informed that the study was purely for academic purpose and as such their participation would not compromise their confidentiality. They were asked if any of them had a feeling not to participate in the study and no one raised any objection. The researchers, assisted by the teachers administered the questionnaires to the students. A total of 251 copies of the questionnaire were administered but 230 copies were included in the analysis due to the invalidation of 21 copies due to incomplete information. The analysis of covariance (ANOVA) was used in analyzing data. This is a special ANOVA used when continuous correlation variables have been included in an analysis. This allows us to examine the relationship between experimentally manipulated variables while controlling other variables that may be correlated with them (Kepel, 1973).

3 Result

The present work examined the influence of social identity, justice perceptions and moral solidarity on citizen’s cooperation to fight terrorism in Nigeria. The results in table 1 shows the bivariate (zero-order) correlation of the variables used in the study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Zero-Order (Bivariate) Correlation of Study Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation against terror</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05, ** p<.01 (2 tailed)

The Table 1 shows the zero-order correlation matrix for the variables. As shown, social identity, (r=0.17, p<.01) and moral solidarity, (r=0.16, p<.05); correlated with cooperation to fight terrorism. Also ethnicity correlated with religion (r=0.18, p<.01) and justice perceptions (r=-0.15, p <.05), while social identity correlated with moral solidarity.
(r=.01). It was also found that justice perception correlated with moral solidarity (r=0.34, p< 0.1).

For the purpose of testing our hypothesis, the ANCOVA table is presented:

**Table 2: ANCOVA table show influence of Social Identity, justice perceptions and moral solidarity on citizen’s cooperation to fight terrorism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Type III Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Model</td>
<td>4575.48</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>508.39</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>14941.94</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14941.94</td>
<td>107.11</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>468.65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>468.65</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social identity</td>
<td>134.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>134.99</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Perceptions</td>
<td>894.96</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>134.96</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral solidarity</td>
<td>2351.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2351.01</td>
<td>16.85</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social identity x Justice Perceptions</td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social identity x Moral solidarity</td>
<td>141.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>141.04</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Perceptions x Moral solidarity</td>
<td>325.60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>325.60</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social identity x moral solidarity x</td>
<td>417.45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>417.45</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice perceptions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>32084.51</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>139.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>392323.00</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrected Total</td>
<td>36659.99</td>
<td>239</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dependent Variable: Cooperation**

From Table 2, hypothesis 1 which stated that there will be main and interaction influence of social identity, justice perceptions and moral solidarity on citizen’s cooperation to fight terrorism was partly supported. The analysis of covariance was conducted using ethnicity and sex as covariates. The results in Table 2 revealed that there was significant main influence of moral solidarity (F=16.85, df=1,230, p<.01) and justice perceptions (F=6.42, df=1, 230, p<.001) on citizen’s cooperation to combat Terrorism. This implied that citizen’s moral solidarity with government and their levels of justice perceptions were important determinants of whether citizens cooperate with government to fight terrorism or not. However, there was no main effect of social identity on cooperation to fight terrorism (F = 0.97, df = 1, 230, p>.01).

**Table 3a: Table of means and Scheffe multiple comparison (LSD) showing influence of justice perceptions (with Covariates) on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>levels</th>
<th>x̄</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>LSD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice Perception</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>35.66</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>39.89</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>4.24*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05

Based on Table 3a, (mean difference Table) it was shown that citizens who cared less about issues of justice were more cooperative with government to combat terrorism than those who were critical about issues of justice (x = 39.89, p < .01).
However, mean difference for moral solidarity, another significant variable, showed positive influence of the variable on citizens’ cooperation to combat terrorism as reflected in Table 3b. Citizens with high levels of moral solidarity were much more helpful than citizens with low moral solidarity in cooperating to fight terrorism.

Table 3b: Table of means and Scheffe multiple comparison (LSD) showing influence of Moral Solidarity (with covariates) on cooperation in Combating Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>levels</th>
<th>x−</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>LSD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral Solidarity</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>41.24</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>6.94*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>34.30</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p <.05

A t-test analysis was also conducted to investigate the role of gender on citizens’ cooperation to fight terror in Nigeria. From the result, there was no gender difference in citizen’s cooperation to fight terrorism with males (x = 38.73, SD = 13.06) not significantly different from females (x = 38.39, SD = 11.53) on cooperation to fight terrorism.

4. Discussion

In this study, we demonstrated the application of a survey method that allowed us to examine adolescents’ social identity, justice perceptions and moral solidarity over a concept of cooperation in fighting insurgency in Nigeria. We did this to extend the findings of earlier works that examined social identity, justice perceptions and moral solidarity as salient indices of group cohesion to conflict situations.

In the study, it was found out that moral solidarity among examined variables has the greatest impact on participants’ cooperative decision in fighting terrorism. This result supports Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) findings that moral solidarity and peoples’ evaluation of the police performance predicted cooperation with the police. Their early study among registered voters in New York City (aged 19-88 years) had highlighted consequences of moral solidarity to include compliance, cooperation and empowerment – three aspects of people’s cooperation with the police.

Our findings also showed that people’s perception of justice predicted their cooperation with the authorities to fight terrorism. Previous studies (e.g. Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; De Goy, 1995; Van des Bos and Lind 2001; Tyler and Blader, 2003) have been supported by our present finding. However, although justice perceptions predicted cooperative behaviour, it further indicated that participants with low (i.e. comparatively less critical) perceptions about procedural and distributive justice reported higher cooperative behaviours than those with high critical opinions. The result in respect of social identity did not show significant influence of social identity on cooperative behaviour. This outcome was tricky and present interpretational dilemma because the zero-order correlation had earlier shown bivariate relations between social identity and cooperation rather than justice perceptions and cooperation. Although it is normal for relationships to be stronger than predictions, the content of social identity and justice perceptions need further examination for similarity of construct. This (the perceived overlap) may be attributed to perceived poor identity association of participants with national aspirations which occasioned the reverse prediction of cooperation by justice
perceptions or the close similarity and high correlation of social identity with moral solidarity.

Logically, moral solidarity cannot exist without convictions of identity and it appears all contents of participants’ identity were projected through portrayals of solidarity to their nation. Tyler and Blader (2003) have asserted that justice procedures shape peoples’ social identity, which in turn influences attitudes, values and behaviours of people in diverse ways. From the result of this study, adolescents’ justice perceptions showed negative influence on cooperation in fighting terrorism due, perhaps to the fact that, social identity with their country is, in this context, in a state of flux as seen in the non-prediction of adolescents’ cooperative behaviour by social identity. Interestingly, the finding supports relational theorist’s observation that injustice can harm our self-regard and hurt our standing within a group setting (Tyler and Lind, 1992).

However, this result does not support Sunshine and Tyler’s (2003) findings but corroborates Tyler and Blader’s (2003) group engagement model in which justice perceptions and in particular procedural justice, play an important role in shaping identification with a group, which in turn links justice perception with cooperation in the group. It appears, with this result, participants were at the crossroads regarding synthesizing the three aspects of national identity. Their seemingly contradictory attitude towards patriotic acts of reporting and fighting terror (i.e the non-significant role of social identity) may be indicative of inherent approach-avoidance conflict of social identity as citizen’s of a country once loved by them but which, has recently been torn apart by suspicion and ethno-religious prejudice. The emotional concepts of national identification, pride and respect are, as they appear, no longer lofty concepts in the minds of these adolescent Nigerians who looked up to their country with much promise but remain despondent due to unending and overwhelming terrorist conflicts.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The study investigated and confirmed the role of moral solidarity and perception of justice in cooperating with one’s nation to end terrorism. It however did not show clear influence of social identity on cooperation. The findings of this study have therefore revealed the ‘harmonious’ relationship between social perception and behavioural responses. It has confirmed that group processes depend greatly on norming, one of the cardinal foundations of group sustenance (Tuckman and Jensen, 1977). The terrorist situation in Nigeria therefore calls for diverse paths to be taken by governmental agencies and citizens towards democratic peace. The Nigerian situation is complex because a number of unclear issues have been implicated in the current crises including religious, economic, political and citizenship disaffections. It appears a difficult task to evolve a common model to capture the present scenario, as it is a matter of speculation that issues of accountability, norm and affinity are also implicated. Government has a task to first win the support of the people through concessions that will lift citizens from social alienation to patriotic participation because that is central to all strategies for defeating terrorism. This could involve relevant measures that may lighten the burdens of living. Because Boko Haram is targeting all Nigerians, the government should seek to unite the citizenry through such measures and discount selfish politics of exclusion and acquisition. Open and inclusive politics should be an integral part of our security strategy because a
society where every community has a voice and no one feels excluded will deny extremists the support they require for their inhuman and vicious campaigns.

Moreover, concrete economic development of all sections of the country should be aggressively pursued as this would dampen support for extremist violence by offering better lives for all our people and opportunities for the young men targeted by extremists for recruitment. Such measures remain good strategies to strengthen peoples' social identity, discount negative justice evaluations and increase moral solidarity thereby opening the floodgate of cooperation against terrorism. Due to the transnational nature of terrorism, it becomes pertinent to complement our domestic security outreach with international support as is currently done. We should cooperate more closely with African nations and other countries of the world to fight this monstrous phenomenon. Such cooperation is critical so as to demonstrate global solidarity which is critical in countering all forms of terror in the world. It is an issue of great concern for Nigeria if teenagers are disillusioned about their country, especially at their impressionable phase of development. In this study, adolescents have shown that they do not cultivate sufficient sense of identity with their country due to the confused state of affairs that participate suspicion and hatred in the country. The police as security gladiators should purge itself of corruption so that public behaviours that may lead to criminality can be detected early. In the same way Nigerians, especially political and religious stakeholders, should engage in self-examination of all issues of discontent towards meaningful resolution. Hardliners in politics and religion should begin to reason that without human life, contesting issues of religion, economics and politics are in themselves meaningless, and so it stands to reason that it is also meaningless to take human lives in pursuit of these issues. In addition, the Federal Government should key into the citizens’ high level of moral solidarity to initiate water-tight gun-control policy to regulate the influx of small arms into the country. Nigeria should also adopt an aggressive and self-sustaining agricultural policy to engage all youths who are idle due to unemployment. Their perceived state of employment will reduce negative justice perceptions and increase their social and patriotic identity. In this direction, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) Scheme should be re-positioned solely as an agricultural programme where youths will engage exclusively in agricultural programmes in order to, not only boost food production but also optimize human and land utilisation. It is time the country begins to base her educational, patriotic and vocational endeavours on the pristine virtues of honesty and hardwork and refrain from doing the serious business of governance with unseriousness. Nigeria’s present predicaments (terrorism and economic depression) are sustained products of moral decline from hardwork and honesty as well as peoples’ poor perceptual and national issues.

More importantly, in relation to lightening citizens’ burdens of living government should, as a matter of policy, begin to initiate sustainable programmes that support families to increase the quality of life of its members. The excessive pressure on families to develop its members in a competitively capitalist and excruciating environment may also be responsible, to a meaningful extent, for the social strain manifesting through all forms of brutality, terrorism and criminality in Nigeria. As can be observed, the breakdown of families through strains of separation, divorce and resultant effect on children should engage the attention of government community based organizations (CBOs) and larger society towards the maintenance of healthy marriages and ensuring stronger families. As we all know, the family driven by marriage is the building block of
society. When marriages and families are healthy, communities thrive and government is limited to the provision of essential services to the people. But when marriages breakdown, communities also breakdown and government’s roles expand as in the example of extremism and crime control. Good governments should place marriage and the family at the centre of their democratic campaigns, working to promote and strengthen societies through cohesive families and achieving multiplier effects through identity projections, pride and prestige. When these identity perceptions are positive, social justice (contentment) becomes subsumed and cooperation to defend the nation (if and when threatened) flows naturally from people’s moral and patriotic inclinations.

7. References

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