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Abstract: This study explored the impact of democracy on the November 2008 Ethno-Religious conflict in Jos North Local Government Area, Plateau state, Nigeria. It espoused the role of ethno-religious identity construction, the indigene-settler question and socio-economic marginalization on the November 2008 Jos North conflict in Plateau state. The survey research design was adopted for the study. The population of the study was put at 429, 300 in the 2006 Census. A total of 300 respondents were administered the questionnaire out of which 272 were returned completed. It was found that the nature and pattern of social cleavages even under democratic regimes can determine in profound measure the irreconcilability of conflict. The three null hypotheses formulated to test the relationship among the November 2008 Jos North conflict and the indigene-settler question, socio-economic marginalization and ethno-religious identity were respectively rejected. Findings showed that the indigene-settler question, socio-economic marginalization and ethno-religious identity construction were at the root of the November 2008 Jos North conflict and other conflicts in the area. Accordingly, the paper advocated the promotion of good governance, the reduction of poverty, and the expansion of the political space, the deconstruction of primordial identities, the strengthening of security institutions and the amendment of the constitutional provisions on citizenship as necessary measures for mitigating violent conflict in Jos and Nigeria generally.

Keywords: Democracy, ethno-religious, conflict, empirical.
1. Introduction

Political competition via the electoral process embraces inevitably and inescapably an uneasy tension between conflict and consensus (Diamond, 1982). Violent conflict has become since 1999 a method of collective action by diverse ethnic and religious groups jostling for political power in Nigeria. No wonder multiparty democracy is said to promote sub-national ethnic and religious demands capable of pitching ethnic groups one against the other in strives that can tear the society apart (Nnoli, 1994). Consequently, since to win the support of an ethnic or religious group is to win a political constituency, ethnically and religiously important political candidates tend to emerge and persist because of gains are likely to accrue from recourse to ethnic and religious sentiments (Wolfinger, 1965; Parenti, 1967). This inevitably propels a reciprocal causality between electoral contests and ethnic and religious based identity conflicts.

Most analysts agree on the constitutive elements of ethno-religious groups but disagree on why and how they are formed and why they occasionally lead to conflict. Some link it with cultural differences among kingship based groups while others associate it with ambitious classes who manipulate dominant identities for selfish purposes (Ukoha, 2005). Further, the critical role of political institutions and pragmatic policies in the framing of ethnic relations has also been underlined. And the activities of colonialists, missionaries and early nationalists are also allegedly implicated in the emergence of ethnicity. While the roots of ethnic and religious conflicts are supposedly linked with colonialism and the cold war (Machava, 2008: Nnoli, 1978), other writers avered that such conflicts are associated with bad governance, ethno-religious politicization and competition and conflict over political power (Anarfi, 2004).

Understandably, it is held that ethnic and religious identities are not natural or accidental but are the products of a conscious effort by social actors. That is why they are not only manifest in conflictive or competitive relations but also in the contexts of cooperation (Ukoha, 2005). Moreover, in Nigeria it is understood that such identities did not frequently lead to large scale violence until the 1980s. Thus, ethnic or religious diversity by itself, is not a major or direct cause of violent conflict, it is the politicization of such identities that drive conflict. In their struggle for power or resources, people usually resort to ethnic, religious and regional appeals in order to gain advantage.

The November 2008 Jos North conflict in Plateau State reportedly followed a disputed local government election which pitted the predominantly Christian indigenes against the Hausa/Fulani settlers (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The violence pitted the Berom, Anaguta and Afizare ethnic groups who were largely supporters of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) candidate, against Muslim ‘non-indigenes’ primarily from the Tonwe and Akov.
While Hausa-Fulani continue to claim they have lived long enough in Jos and that their demographic size should make them major stakeholders. The ‘indigenes’ have always vehemently resisted this, arguing that they are sons of the soil hence the administrative powers and governance of Jos North should be solely theirs. Jos North Local Government Area has a total of twenty wards. Out of these, the Hausa-Fulani are the predominant majority in seven while the other thirteen are inhabited by the Berom, Afizare, Anaguta, Buji, Igbo, Yoruba, Tiv, Jukun and other ethnic groups (Alamu, 2009). Elections in Jos have often been violent and crowded affairs, explaining why there has hardly been any local government elections since the country’s return to democratic rule in 1999 (Ambe-Uva, 2010; Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010).

This article is a product of an empirical survey conducted to assess the impact of democracy on the November 2008 Jos North conflict. Accordingly, the following three null hypotheses were developed to guide the study:

(i) There is no relationship between ethno-religious identity and the November 2008 Jos North conflict
(ii) There is no relationship between the indigene-settler question and the November 2008 Jos North conflict
(iii) There is no relationship between socio-economic marginalization and the November 2008 Jos North conflict.

2. Literature Review

Nigeria is a complex, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural and multi-religious polity with a diversity of over 450 ethnic groups (Danfulani, 2006). Three quarters of these ethnic groups are from the middle-belt of Nigeria, thus making it a polyglot region with unparalleled trappings in cultural diversity and social organizations (Ibrahim, 2000). 54 of the ethnic groups are found in plateau state, where Bantu, Kwa and Afro-Asiatic sub-families of the Benue-Congo and Chad meet. Ethno-religious issues are increasingly becoming divisive in Nigeria and Plateau state in particular, thereby constituting growing conflict flash-points (Gaya-Best, 2007). The most mind boggling manifestation of this was the conflict that occurred in Jos on September 7, 2001, breaking all illusions of its
being the home of peace and causing wanton destruction of lives and property. Since then, ethno-religious and political conflict has continued to re-occur in Jos.

Jos is situated in the central belt of Nigeria, otherwise referred to as the middle-belt, a geo-political term with ethno-religious connotations (Ambe-Uva, 2010). It was founded as a tin mining city by the British at the beginning of the 20th century (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002). Disagreements in respect of who found the city is part of the problem that sparked off the conflict (Gaya-Best, 2007). An expedition team sent by the Royal Niger Company in London to tour the Jos area investigated and confirmed the presence of tin ore in commercial quantities in the high Jos Mountains. Consequently, the British set up a mining camp at Naraguta village, north of present day Jos between 1905 and 1909. Prior to the British occupation, the Hausa/Fulani interacted with indigenous Jos communities only through mutual trade links as earlier attempts by the Jihadist Uthman Dan Fodio and his followers to conquer the Jos area failed (Danfulani and Fwatshak, 2002).

It is widely reported that the indigenous ethnic groups in Jos namely, the Berom, Anaguta (Naraguta) and Afizare (Jarawa) and their neighbours the Buji, Irigwe (Miango), Bache (Rukuba) amongst others were unwilling to work in the mines because of the meager pay. This is said to have left the British with no choice than to bring in Hausa/Fulani from Sokoto, Kano, Katsina, Lere, Zaria and Bauchi to work on the Jos mines. Subsequently, Hausa/Fulani colonies started to emerge in Jos in association with the tin mines at Naraguta, Dilimi, Gidin-Akwati, Kuni, Heipang, Gana-ropp, Ganan-Daji, BarkinLadi, Bukuru, Kuru, DorowanBabiye, Kasa amongst others (Ames, 1934).

Today, the ownership of Jos is hotly contested among the three main indigenous groups (Berom, Anaguta and Afizare) on the one hand and the descendants of the Hausa/Fulani on the other. The Hausa/Fulani alleged that on arriving Jos area, the place was virgin, a zangoor transit camp for people travelling from the north to the south whereupon they founded and built the city (Higazi, 2011). Conversely, the three indigenous groups argue among themselves over the ownership of Jos which they referred to in pre-modern times as Gwosh. According to them, ‘Jos’ is a British mispronunciation of Gwosh, the traditional name.

Abdu (2002) averred that through a combination of colonial administrative policies, empowerment of the Hausa/Fulani political system as a result of indirect rule and the consequent placement of Jos under the Bauchi province, tension began to emanate in the 1930s. The tense atmosphere did not escalate into overt conflict but it showed that ethnic relations even in the 1930s were not cordial. With the collapse of the mining industry, the
relationship between the Hausa/Fulani and the indigenous communities degenerated as many of the former miners transmuted to farmers. As a result, land became a serious question and the ownership of it became a serious political issue. The indigenous ethnic groups in Jos are largely Christians tied to land as peasant farmers or workers in the civil service while the mainly Muslim minorities are Hausa dry season farmers and cattle-rearing Fulani. Thus, land remains an important emotive factor to a region predominantly inhabited by farmers and cattle herders who usually are mutually conflict prone.

Signals pointing towards the manifestation of contentious issues between the Hausa/Fulani and the indigenous groups started emanating in Jos in the 1990s. The 1990s witnessed resurgence in conflict this time centering on the control of Jos North local government carved out of the former Jos local government area in 1991. It appeared to have enhanced the Hausa/Fulani hegemonic control of political power in the newly created local government. This exacerbated tension as the Hausa/Fulani were seen to have been given impetus to control Jos while the indigenes were sidelined. On April 12, 1994, the growing tension escalated into violent clashes when a Hausa/Fulani was appointed Chairman of Jos North local government management committee while a man each from Berom, Igbo, Yoruba and Jarawa were members (Abdu, 2002). The ‘indigenes’ vehemently objected to the appointments especially that of the chairman of the committee. The rival groups organized protests which led to violent confrontations and caused the burning down of worship places and markets.

On March 16, 1996 electoral violence broke out in Angwan Rogo, a predominantly Hausa/Fulani settlement. The ‘indigenes’ alleged that the Hausa/Fulani tried to rig the elections by smuggling in ‘Shagari’ voters from the northern part of the country. Based on this, the electoral officer proceeded to screen out the ‘unknown faces’, which angered Hausa/Fulani youths and the violence that quickly followed left 3 people dead (Abdu, 2002).

With the return to multi-party democracy in 1999, the Hausa/Fulani found that they had been sidelined on account of their low numerical strength, while the majorly Christian indigenes became eager to exercise their voting right to wrest political control from the Hausa/Fulani. During this period, the introduction of Sharia (Islamic legal system) in some northern states led to the influx of marginal Muslims and other people into Jos thus putting pressure on its economy, social facilities and even inter-ethnic and religious relations.

The September 2001 conflict was caused among other things by the appointment of Alhaji Mohammed Muktar, a former chairman of Jos North local government as the coordinator
of the federal government’s National Poverty Alleviation Programme in the local government. The indigenous youths rejected the appointment and were aggrieved by the appointment of a person from the minority Jasawa group (Hausa/Fulani) to head such a sensitive office (Ojukwu and Onifade, 2010). The resulting sectarian violence claimed over 1,000 lives (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The strain between ‘indigene’ and ‘non-indigene’ in Jos has been most visible in the competition for political posts.

On November 28 and 29, 2008 inter-communal violence erupted again in Jos following the disputed local government election of November 27. It was sparked by the declaration of the PDP candidate (who was backed by the indigenous groups) as winner of the Jos North local government election. The candidate polled 92,907 votes to beat his closest rival from ANPP, who was a Hausa/Fulani with 72,890 votes (Ambe-Uva, 2010). The outbreak of the 2008 conflict indicated another sign of frosty relations between the Hausa/Fulani and the indigenous population. In the ensuing violence, more than 700 people were reported dead while thousands took refuge in several locations (Adegboyega, 2008). Thus, the recurring conflicts between Hausa/Fulani and the indigenous communities in Jos have opened the Pandora’s Box on the indigene-settler discourse and citizenship crisis in Nigeria.

2.1 Theorizing Identity Politics
Identity is simply a combination of socio-cultural characteristics which individuals share with others, and on the basis of which one group can be distinguished from others. Identity consists of ethnic, religious, gender, class and other layers all of which refer to the same person either in self-definition or as defined by others (Alubo, 2009). It is any group attribute that provides recognition or definition, reference, affinity, coherence and meaning for individuals of the group acting collectively or individually (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). As a political concept, identity politics refer to the political activity of various ethnic, religious and cultural organizations in demanding for greater economic, social and political rights or self determination.

Identity politics seeks to represent and advance the interests of particular groups, the members of whom often share and unite around common experiences of perceived social and economic injustice relative to the society of which they form part and exist in. This usually gives rise to a political basis around which they unite and begin to assert themselves in society (Zweri and Zahid, 2007). Beyond the recognition of ethnic, religious or cultural parallelism, identity politics seeks to carry these identities forward to a political framework anchored upon that identity. In short, it is the form in which the citizenship question is posed and practically experienced.
The nature of Nigeria’s identity diversity is aptly captured in Geertz’s (1967) celebrated distinction between primordial and civil ties. While he considered primordial ties as basically ascriptive and based on life’s givens (tribe, kinship, ethnicity, race etc), he defined civil ties in terms of industrially induced aggregations like class, political party affiliation, interest group membership and so on. Geertz assumes that given the prevalence of primordial ties in Africa and Asia, there is likelihood of continuation of conflict along the lines of identity. Accordingly, he argued for the erosion of primordial identities and their replacement with civil identities of the work place (integrative revolution); what Oommen (1997) describes as the transition from inequality generating ethnicity and nationality identities to inclusionary and equality-oriented citizenship.

Geertz’s scheme has been criticized for presenting primordial and civil ties as mutually exclusive categories because in reality ties like ethnicity and kinship cannot be understood in isolation of class and other identities (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). Moreover, it is held that even identities based on the so-called givens of life are constructed and are not natural (Yeros, 1999). And class and other civil ties hardly generate equality, especially where they are recursive with ethnicity and other supposedly primordial identities.

Nigeria presents a complex mosaic of individual as well as crisscrossing and recursive identities of which ethnic, religious, regional and communal alignments are the most salient and the main basis for conflict. What clearly emerges is that any examination of Nigeria’s identity would have to be inclusive of all ties, both civil and primordial and the ways in which they are intricately linked. It is the only way we can properly situate the various identities in their fuller, robust and recursive contexts. Citizens often assume such identities for political purposes or for contestations over citizenship, or for access to resources or privileges.

Plateau, a state of plural ethnicity and religion has had several cases of identity-based conflicts. It is the second most ethnically diverse state in Nigeria after Adamawa (Alubo, 2006). Like elsewhere in Nigeria, this diverse identity is seen as bearing two identities; indigenes and settlers. Also there are two major religions, Islam and Christianity. In Plateau, most of the so-called settlers are Muslims while the supposed indigenes are Christians or animists. Usually, crisis which begin as economic or politically based usually assume ethnic and religious dimensions in a telling conflation of religion and ethnicity. While indigenes have different identities, these are neatly folded into a common umbrella for purposes of uniting against a perceived common enemy. Thus, the November 2008 Jos North conflict illustrates how identity is used as a basis to access opportunities and ultimately inclusive citizenship.
2.2 Research Questions

The following research questions were advanced for the study:

(i) Did ethno-religious identity contribute to the outbreak of the November 2008 Jos North conflict?

(ii) Was the indigene-settler question implicated in the November 2008 Jos North conflict?

(iii) Did poverty and socio-economic marginalization contribute to the outbreak of the November 2008 Jos North conflict?

3. Methodology

This research paper adopted the survey research design which is very much in vogue in the social sciences. Through this method and via the designing and administration of questionnaires, the researcher elicited information from victims as well as residents of Jos North regarding the November 2008 conflict. The population of the study was the entire population of Jos North local government area which was put at 429,300 in the 2006 census. The sample size was 300. The selected respondents served the questionnaire were selected through the purposive sampling method. This implies that such respondents were those the researcher considered verse, knowledgeable and also mature enough to discuss the phenomenon that was investigated. The research instrument used was the questionnaire designed by the researcher. The questionnaire was structured into two sections, A and B. While section A dwelt on the bio-data of respondents, section B contained 10 questions in which the respondents were required to indicate their choices on a threepoint Likert type rating scale of Agree (A), Undecided (U), and Disagree (D) with a view to elicit data on the impact of democracy on the November 2008 Jos North conflict.

Table 1: Bio-data of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Male 158 (58.1%); Female 114(41.9%)</td>
<td>272(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>18-35 36-53 140(51.5%); 54 and above 53(19.5%)</td>
<td>272(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Christianity 114(41.9%); Islam 112(41.2%); Traditional 46(16.9)</td>
<td>Afizare 56(20.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
<td>Hausa/Fulani 68(25%); Berom 79(29%); Anaguta 54(19.9)</td>
<td>Others 15(5.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data derived from the questionnaire were analyzed using the chi-square statistical technique. Consequently, the chi-square test was used to test the hypotheses formulated for the study.

4. Results

Of the 300 questionnaires administered, 272 representing 90.7% were returned completed while 28 representing 9.3% were not returned. Table 1 indicates that the respondents consisted of 158 males (58.1% of the sample) and 114 females (41.9% of the sample). 79 respondents (29.0%) were between 18-35 years, 140 of them (51.5%) were between 36-53 years, while 53 respondents (19.5%) were 54 years and above. 114 respondents (41.9%) were Christians, 112 (41.2%) practice Islam while 46 of them (16.9%) practice traditional religion. Of the respondents, 68 (25%) were Hausa/Fulani, 79 (29%) were from the Berom ethnic group, 54 (19.9%) were Anaguta, 56 (20.6%) were of the Afizare extraction and 15 (5.5%) were from other ethnic groups.

As noted earlier, 300 copies of the questionnaire were printed and distributed amongst 300 respondents in Jos North local government area. Out of these, 272 were returned completed and in usable form while 28 were not returned. Below is the test of hypotheses formulated for the study.

Table 2: (Contingency table for) hypothesis 1: There is no significant relationship between ethno-religious identity and the November 2008 Jos North conflict (Data for testing hypothesis 1 was sourced from item number 5 on questionnaire).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groupings</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degree of freedom = (R-1)(C-1)
= (3-1)(3-1)
= 2x2 = 4 at 0.05 level of significance

Calculated $\chi^2 = 34.54$

Critical $\chi^2 = 9.49$

Decision rule: The computed value of chi square ($\chi^2$) at 0.05 level of significance and 4 degree of freedom is 34.54. This is greater than the critical value (table value) of 9.49. We therefore reject the null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the research hypothesis (Hr).
which states that there is a relationship between ethno-religious identity and the November 2008 Jos North conflict.

Table 3: (Contingency table for) Hypothesis 2: There is no significant relationship between the indigene-settler question and the November 2008 Jos North conflict (Data for this test was derived from item number 1 on questionnaire)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groupings</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigene</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa/Fulani</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degree of freedom = (R-1)(C-1) = (3-1)(3-1) = 2x2 = 4 at 0.05 level of significance.

Calculated $\chi^2 = 18.26$
Critical $\chi^2 = 9.49$.

**Decision rule**: The computed value of chi-square ($\chi^2$) at 0.05 level of significance and 4 degree of freedom is 18.26. This is greater than the critical value of 9.49. We thus reject the null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the research hypothesis which states that there is a significant relationship between the indigene-settler question and the November 2008 Jos North conflict.

Table 4: (Contingency table for) Hypothesis 3: There is no significant relationship between socio-economic marginalization and the November 2008 Jos North conflict. (Data for this hypothesis was obtained from item number 4 on questionnaire)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groupings</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prim. Sch.&amp; below</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Sch.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Degree of freedom = (R-1)(C-1) = (3-1)(3-1) = 2x2 = 4 at 0.05 level of significance

Calculated $\chi^2 = 16.29$
Critical $\chi^2 = 9.49$
**Decision rule:** Since the calculated value of $\chi^2(16.29)$ is greater than the table value (9.49) at 0.05 level of significance, we reject the null hypothesis (Ho) and accept the research hypothesis (Hr) which states that there is a relationship between socio-economic marginalization and the November 2008 Jos North conflict.

5. **Discussion**

Hypothesis one states that there is no significant relationship between ethno-religious identity and the November 2008 Jos North conflict. However, based on data derived in respect of the above hypothesis, majority of the respondents administered the questionnaire agreed that electoral contests have often led to the outbreak of ethno-religious conflict in the area. This implies that in Jos, democratic competition has inevitably dovetailed with a surge in ethno-religious identity construction. In the struggle to acquire and exercise political power, ethnic and religious sentiments are often freely employed by competing groups as a means of gaining advantage. Accordingly, we reject the Null hypothesis and accept the Alternate hypothesis which states that there is a significant relationship between elections and the November 2008 Jos North conflict.

The second hypothesis states that there is no significant relationship between the indigene-settler question and the November 2008 Jos North conflict. The calculated data in respect of hypothesis two indicated that majority of the respondents were of the opinion that the indigene-settler problem contributed to the emergence of the November 2008 Jos North conflict. This showed that the citizenship issue is crucial for understanding violent conflict and social unrest on the plateau. The indigene/settler polemic has ethnic, communal, religious and regional origins that evolved from an entrenched system of discriminatory practices in which non-indigenes, migrants and settlers are denied equal access to resources, to which ‘sons’ and ‘daughters’ of the ‘soil’ have first or exclusionary access. This trend produces and sustains a hierarchical, unequal and ranked system of citizenship that has spurned conflict in Jos and elsewhere in Nigeria. Consequently, the null hypothesis was rejected and the research hypothesis which states that there is a significant relationship between the indigene-settler question and the November 2008 Jos North conflict was accepted.

Hypothesis three states that there is no significant relationship between socio-economic marginalization and the November 2008 Jos North conflict. Nonetheless, data analyzed with regards to the hypothesis indicate that majority of the respondents identified poverty and socio-economic marginalization as proximate triggers of the November 2008 Jos North conflict. When the state fails to cater for the yearnings and aspirations of its people, including the provision of jobs and the initiation and implementation of poverty-reducing policies and programmes, there is a high propensity for people to recourse to violence in
their struggle for scarce resources. It is worse when some individuals or groups perceive themselves as marginalized in relation to other groups, as this creates impetus for conflict. In this vein, the null hypothesis was also rejected and the research hypothesis stating that there is a significant relationship between poverty socio-economic marginalization and the November 2008 Jos North conflict was accepted.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations
This research paper has revealed that the indigene-settler question, ethno-religious identity construction and perceived socio-economic marginalization are at the root of the November 2008 and perhaps other conflicts in Jos. Clearly, ethnic and religious identities in themselves do not create conflict; it is the politicization of these identities that breed conflict. Such identities become problematic when access to opportunities in the political system in terms of power and resources are dependent on membership of a particular ethnic and/or religious group. The interests and goals that such groups pursue are rooted in the quest for access to power and opportunities via patronage and clientelism which can only be obtained through the use of state machinery. In the process, the privatization of violence and the mobilization of ethnic and religious sentiments are often freely employed by the political elites.

The fact that poverty and socio-economic marginalization leads to aggressive behavior that can take on ethnic and religious dimensions in Nigeria is affirmed by the findings of this study. In Jos North as this study has shown, members of ethnic/religious groups who feel alienated or deprived often see their hardship as resulting from the control of politics by members of rival groups. This scenario has whipped up primordial sentiments which regrettably have led to obdurate conflict in Jos and other parts of Nigeria.

7. Recommendations
Based on the foregoing, the following policy suggestions are advanced;
One major cause of violence in Nigeria since independence has been the restriction of the political space. In Jos North, there have been instances when the political space was alleged to have been so narrowed that it became a one religious/ethnic group enclave, thereby fanning the embers of discord. Thus, the expansion of the political space to ensure that all ethnic and religious groups in Jos are given equal right to aspire, contest and win elections is necessary to nip the Jos conflicts in the bud. A proactive and result oriented civil society can be useful in the articulation of this agenda.

There appears to be fundamental flaws in the 1999 Nigerian constitution in respect of the indigene-settler question. There is a sense in which contradictions in certain provisions of the constitution have accentuated the citizenship problem. Section 147 of the constitution
provides that the president shall appoint at least one minister from each state who shall be an indigene of such a state. This provision conflicts with its notion of citizens which section 25(1a) articulates. These provisions and other relevant provisions need to be reconciled through a constitutional reform to be undertaken with due consultation with the Nigerian people. In this way, the indigene/settler challenge can be relegated to the backwaters of history.

The promotion of good governance at all levels of governmental authority remains the surest antidote to the problem of democratic sustenance in Nigeria. In the absence of good governance, the ruling elite recourse to ethnic and religious appeals thereby inflaming the primordial identities of the masses. Accordingly, only a transparent and accountable leadership that rises above sentimental considerations can enhance the peaceful co-existence of both autochthons and settlers in Jos.

It is imperative for government and other relevant agencies to initiate poverty-reducing policies and programmes that will be inclusive of all identities as a means to reduce the level of poverty and marginalization currently suffered by members of different ethnic groups in Jos.

Much of the conflict on the Plateau and other parts of Nigeria have resulted largely from illiteracy and ignorance. Thus, it is expedient to galvanize education by making it mandatory and free especially at primary and secondary school levels. Nationalism should also be included as a subject in the curriculum to be taught at these levels of education. It is only through education that people can be exposed to the several other peaceful means for resolving grievances, rather than resorting to violence.

The inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the security architecture in Jos and Nigeria generally is underscored by the scope, magnitude and persistence of violent conflicts throughout the country. The security institutions’ response to conflict situations are either too late or poorly coordinated which perhaps explains the persistence of conflict in Jos and elsewhere in Nigeria. Strengthening the Police, Army, state security and other security outfits through capacity building and the provision of state of the art weaponry can prove useful in mitigating the intractable conflicts. Also, measures should be put in place to prevent the elite manipulation of security personnel for parochial interests.

8. References


Appendix 1

Notes

The formula for chi-square as applied to this study is

$$\chi^2 = \sum (fo - fe)^2$$

where:

$\chi^2$= Chi-square

fo is the observed frequency in a given category.

fe is the expected frequency in a given category.

Appendix 2

Administered questionnaire items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>AUD</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The recurrent crisis in Jos North is precisely a crisis of citizenship</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The indigenes in Jos North are not receptive to foreigners</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Hausa/Fulani are settlers in Jos North</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
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<td>4. Poverty and socio-economic marginalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. are among the root causes of the November 2008 Jos North conflict</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Electorates in Jos North vote candidates based on their ethnic/religious extraction</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. The outbreak of the conflict was a demonstration of lack of good governance</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. The federal and state governments played</td>
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roles that complicated and exacerbated the crisis

9. The intervention of the federal and state governments helped to reduce the scale of the conflict

10. The involvement of security operatives in the conflict was prompt and timely

11. The conflict revolved around the politics of appointments/elections